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Abstract
We offer the ﬁrst large scale, multiple source analysis of the outcome of what may be
the most extensive effort to selectively censor human expression ever implemented.
To do this, we have devised a system to locate, download, and analyze the content
of millions of social media posts originating from nearly 1,400 different social me-
dia services all over China before the Chinese government is able to ﬁnd, evaluate,
and censor (i.e., remove from the Internet) the large subset they deem objectionable.
Using modern computer-assisted text analytic methods that we adapt to and validate
in the Chinese language, we compare the substantive content of posts censored to
those not censored over time in each of 85 topic areas. Contrary to previous un-
derstandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders,
and its policies are not more likely to be censored. Instead, we show that the cen-
sorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that
represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content. Censorship is
oriented toward attempting to forestall collective activities that are occurring now or
may occur in the future — and, as such, seem to clearly expose government intent.
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The size and sophistication of the Chinese government’s program to selectively censor
the expressed views of the Chinese people is unprecedented in recorded world history.
Unlike in the U.S., where social media is centralized through a few providers, in China
it is fractured across hundreds of local sites. Much of the responsiblity for censorship
is devolved to these internet content providers, who may be ﬁned or shut down if they
fail to comply with government censorship guidelines. To comply with the government,
each individual site privately employing up to 1,000 censors. Additionally, approximately
20,000–50,000 Internet police and an estimated 250,000–300,000 “50 cent party mem-
bers” (wumao dang) at all levels of government — central, provincial, and local — partic-
ipate in this huge effort (Chen and Ang 2011, and our interviews with informants, granted
anonymity). China overall is tied with Burma at 187th of 197 countries on a scale of press
freedom (Freedom House, 2012), but the Chinese censorship effort is by far the largest.
In this paper, we show that this program, designed to limit freedom of speech of
Chinese people, paradoxically also exposes an extraordinarily rich source of informa-
tion about the Chinese government’s interests, intentions, and goals — a subject of long-
standing interest to the scholarly and policy communities. The information we unearth is
available in continuous time, rather than the usual sporadic media reports of the leaders’
sometimes visible actions. We use this new information to develop a theory of the overall
purpose of the censorship program, and thus to reveal some of the most basic goals of the
Chinese leadership that until now have been the subject of intense speculation but neces-
sarily little empirical analysis. The information we unearth is also a treasure trove that
can be used for many other scholarly (and practical) purposes. Upon publication, we will
make available replication information for further analyses by other scholars.
Our central theoretical ﬁnding is that, contrary to much research and commentary, the
purposeofthecensorshipprogramisnot tosupresscriticismofthestateortheCommunist
Party. Indeed, despite widespread censorship of social media, we ﬁnd that when the Chi-
nese people write scathing criticisms of their government and its leaders, the probability
that their post will be censored does not increase. Instead, we ﬁnd that the purpose of the
1censorship program is to reduce the probability of collective action by clipping social ties
whenever any collective movements are in evidence or expected. We demonstrate these
points and then discuss their far-reaching implications for many research areas within the
study of Chinese politics and comparative politics.
We begin in Section 2 by deﬁning two theories of Chinese censorship. Section 3
describes our unique data source and how we gathered it. Section 4 lays out our strategy
for analysis. Section 5 gives our results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Government Intentions and the Purpose of Censorship
Previous Indicators of Government Intent Deciphering the opaque intentions and
goals of the leaders of the Chinese regime was once the central focus of scholarly research
on elite politics in China, where Western researchers used Kremlinology — or Pekingol-
ogy — as a methodological strategy (Chang, 1983; Charles, 1966; Hinton, 1955; MacFar-
quhar, 1974, 1983; Schurmann, 1966; Teiwes, 1979). With the Cultural Revolution and
with China’s economic opening, more sources of data became available to researchers,
and scholars shifted their focus to areas where information was more accessible. Stud-
ies of China today rely on government statistics, public opinion surveys, interviews with
local ofﬁcials, as well as measures of the visible actions of government ofﬁcials and the
government as a whole (Guo, 2009; Kung and Chen, 2011; Tsai, 2007a,b; Shih, 2008).
These sources are well-suited to answer other important political science questions, but in
gauging government intent, they are widely known to be indirect, very sparsely sampled,
and often of dubious value. For example, government statistics, such as the number of
“mass” incidents, could offer a view of government interests, but only if we could some-
how separate true numbers from government manipulation. Similarly, sample surveys can
be informative, but the government obviously keeps information from ordinary citizens,
and even when respondents have the information researchers are seeking they may not be
willing to express themselves freely. In situations where direct interviews with ofﬁcials
are possible, researchers are in the position of having to read tea leaves to ascertain what
their informants really believe.
2Measuring intent is all the more difﬁcult with the sparse information coming from
existing methods because the Chinese government is not a monolithic entity. In fact, in
those instances when different agencies, leaders, or levels of government work at cross-
purposes, even the concept of a unitary intent or motivation may be difﬁcult to deﬁne,
much less measure. We cannot solve all these problems, but by providing more informa-
tion about the state’s revealed preferences through their censorship behavior, we may be
somewhat better able to produce useful measures of intent.
Theories of Censorship We attempt to complement the important work on how censor-
ship isconducted, and howthe Internet mayincrease the spacefor public discourse(Duan,
2007; Edmond, 2012; Egorov, Guriev and Sonin, 2009; Esarey and Qiang, 2008, 2011;
Herold, 2011; Lindtner and Szablewicz, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012; Yang, 2009; Qiang,
2011), by beginning to build an empirically documented theory of why the government
censors and what it is trying to achieve through this extensive program. While current
scholarship draws the reasonable but broad conclusion that Chinese government censor-
ship is aimed at maintaining the status quo for the current regime, we focus on what
speciﬁcally the government believes is critical, and what actions it takes, to accomplish
this goal.
To do this, we distinguish two theories of what constitutes the goals of the Chinese
regime as implemented in their censorship program, each reﬂecting a different perspec-
tive on what threatens the stability of the regime. First is a state critique theory, which
posits that the goal of the Chinese leadership is to supress dissent, and to prune human
expression that ﬁnds fault with elements of the Chinese state, its policies, or its leaders.
The result is to make the sum total of available public expression more favorable to those
in power. Many types of state critique are included in this idea, such as poor government
performance.
Second is what we call the theory of collective action potential: the target of censor-
shipispeoplewhojointogethertoexpressthemselvescollectively, stimulatedbysomeone
other than the government, and seem to have the potential to generate collective action. In
this view, collective expressions — many people communicating on social media on the
3same subject — regarding actual collective actions, such as protests, as well as those about
events that seem likely to generate collective actions but have not yet done so, are likely
to be censored. Whether social media posts with collective action potential ﬁnd fault with
or assign praise to the state, or are about subjects unrelated to the state, is unrelated to this
theory.
An alternative way to describe what we call “collective action potential” is the appar-
ent perspective of the Chinese government, where collective expression organized outside
of governmental control equals factionalism and ultimately chaos and disorder. For ex-
ample, on the eve of Communist Party’s 90th birthday, the state-run Xinhua news agency
issued an opinion that western-style parliamentary democracy would lead to a repetition
of the turbulent factionalism of China’s Cultural Revolution (http://j.mp/McRDXk).
Similarly, at the Fourth Session of the 11th National Peoples Congress in March of 2011,
WuBangguo, memberofthePolitburoStandingCommitteeandChairmanoftheStanding
Committee of the National People’s Congress, said that “On the basis of China’s condi-
tions...we’ll not employ a system of multiple parties holding ofﬁce in rotation” in order
to avoid “an abyss of internal disorder” (http://j.mp/Ldhp25). China observers
have often noted the emphasis placed by the Chinese government on maintaining stability
(Shirk, 2007; Whyte, 2010; Zhang et al., 2002), as well as the government’s desire to limit
collective action by clipping social ties (Perry, 2002, 2008). The Chinese regime encoun-
ters a great deal of contention and collective action; according to Sun Liping, a profes-
sor of Sociology at Tsinghua University, China experienced 180,000 “mass incidents” in
2010 (http://j.mp/McQeji). Because the government encounters collective action
frequently, it inﬂuences the actions and perceptions of the regime. The stated perspective
of the Chinese government is that limitations on horizontal communications is a legiti-
mate and effective action designed to protect its people (Perry, 2010) — in other words, a
paternalistic strategy to avoid chaos and disorder, given the conditions of Chinese society.
Current scholarship has not been able to differentiate empirically between the two the-
ories we offer. Marolt (2011) writes that online postings are censored when they “either
criticize China’s party-state and its policies directly or advocate collective political ac-
4tion.” MacKinnon (2012) argues that during the Wenzhou high speed rail crash, Internet
content providers were asked to “track and censor critical postings.” Esarey and Qiang
(2008) ﬁnd that Chinese bloggers use satire to convey criticism of the state in order to
avoid harsh repression. Esarey and Qiang (2011) write that party leaders are most fearful
of “Concerted efforts by inﬂuential netizens to pressure the government to change pol-
icy,” but identify these pressures as criticism of the state. Shirk (2011) argues that the aim
of censorship is to constrain the mobilization of political opposition, but her examples
suggest that critical viewpoints are those that are suppressed.
Collective action in the form of protests is often thought to be the death knell of au-
thoritarian regimes. Protests in East Germany, Eastern Europe, and most recently the
Middle East have all preceded regime change (Ash, 2002; Lohmann, 1994; Przeworski
et al., 2000). A great deal of scholarship on China has focused on what leads people to
protest and their tactics (Blecher, 2002; Cai, 2002; Chen, 2000; Lee, 2007; O’Brien and
Li, 2006; Perry, 2002, 2008). The Chinese state seems focused on preventing protest at
all costs—and, indeed, the prevalence of collective action is part of the formal evalua-
tion criteria for local ofﬁcials (Edin, 2003). However, several recent works argue that
authoritarian regimes may expect and welcome substantively narrow protests as a way of
enhancing regime stability by identifying, and then dealing with, discontented commu-
nities (Dimitrov, 2008; Lorentzen, 2010; Chen, 2012). Chen (2012) argues that small,
isolated protests have a long tradition in China and are an expected part of government.
Outline of Results The nature of the two theories means that either or both could be
correct or incorrect. Here, we offer evidence that, with few exceptions, the answer is
simple: state critique theory is incorrect and the theory of collection action potential is
correct. Our data show that the Chinese censorship program allows for a wide variety of
criticisms of the Chinese government, its ofﬁcials, and its policies. As it turns out, censor-
ship is primarily aimed at restricting the spread of information that may lead to collective
action, regardless of whether or not the expression is in direct opposition to the state and
whether or not it is related to government policies. Large increases in online volume are
good predictors of censorship when these increases are associated with events related to
5collective action, e.g., protest on the ground. In addition, we measure sentiment within
each of these events and show that during these events, the government censors views
that are both supportive and critical of the state. These results reveal that the Chinese
regime believes supressing social media posts with collective action potential, rather than
suppression of criticism, is crucial to maintaining power.
3 Data
We describe here the challenges involved in collecting large quantities of detailed infor-
mation that the Chinese government does not want anyone to see and goes to great lengths
to prevent anyone from accessing. We discuss the types of censorship we study, our data
collection process, the limitations of this study, and ways we organize the data for subse-
quent analyses.
3.1 Types of Censorship
Human expression is censored in Chinese social media in at least three ways, the last of
which is the focus of our study. First is “The Great Firewall of China,” which disallows
certain entire web sites from operating in the country. The Great Firewall is an obvi-
ous problem for foreign Internet ﬁrms, and for the Chinese people interacting with others
outside of China on these services, but it does little to limit the expressive power of Chi-
nese people who can ﬁnd other sites to express themselves in similar ways. For example,
Facebook is blocked in China but RenRen is a close substitute; similarly Sina Weibo is a
popular Chinese clone of Twitter, which is also unavailable.
Second is “keyword blocking” which stops a user from posting text that contain
banned words or phrases. This has limited effect on freedom of speech, since netizens
can outwit automated programs. To do so, they use analogies, metaphors, satire, and other
evasions. The Chinese language offers novel evasions, such as substituting characters for
those banned with others that have unrelated meanings but sound alike (“homophones”)
or look similar (“homographs”). An example of a homograph is , which has the
nonsensical literal meaning of “eye-ﬁeld” but is used by World of Warcraft players to
6substitute for the banned but similarly shaped which means freedom. As an ex-
ample of a homophone, the sound “hexie” is often written as , which means “river
crab,” but is used to refer to , which is the ofﬁcial state policy of a “harmonious
society”.
Once past the ﬁrst two barriers to freedom of speech, the text gets posted on the web
and the censors read and remove those they ﬁnd objectionable. Near as we can tell from
the literature, observers, private conversations with those inside several governments, and
an examination of the data, content ﬁltering is in large part a manual effort — censors read
post by hand. Automated methods appear to be an auxiliary part of this effort. Unlike
The Great Firewall and keyword blocking, hand censoring cannot be evaded by clever
phrasing. Thus, it is this last and most extensive form of censoring that we focus on in
this paper.
3.2 Collection
We begin with social media blogs in which it is at least possible for writers to express
themselves fully, prior to possible censorship, and leaving to other research social me-
dia services that constrain authors to very short Twitter-like (weibo) posts (e.g., Bamman,
O’Connor and Smith, 2012). In many countries, such as the U.S., almost all blog posts
appear on a few large sites (Facebook, Google’s blogspot, Tumblr, etc.); China does have
some big sites such as sina.com, but a large portion of its social media landscape is ﬁnely
distributed over numerous individual sites, e.g., local bbs forums. This difference poses
a considerable logistical challenge for data collection — with different web addresses,
different software interfaces, different companies and local authorities monitoring those
accessing the sites, different network reliabilities, access speeds, terms of use, and cen-
sorship modalities, and different ways of potentially hindering or stopping our data col-
lection. Fortunately, the structure of Chinese social media also turns out to pose a special
opportunity for studying localized control of collective expression, since the numerous
local sites provide considerable information about the geolocation of posts, much more
than is available even then in the U.S.
The most complicated engineering challenges in our data collection process involves
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Figure 1: The Fractured Structure of the Chinese Social Media Landscape
locating, accessing, and downloading posts from many web sites before Internet content
providers or the government reads and censors those that are deemed by authorities as
objectionable;1 revisiting each post frequently enough to learn if and when it was cen-
sored; and proceeding with data collection in so many places in China without affecting
the system we were studying or being prevented from studying it. The reason we are able
to accomplish this is because our data collection methods are highly automated whereas
Chinese censorship entails manual effort. Our extensive engineering effort, which we
do not detail here for obvious reasons, is executed at many locations around the world,
including inside China.
Ultimately, we were able to locate, obtain access to, and download social media posts
from 1,382 Chinese websites during the ﬁrst half of 2011. The most striking feature of
the structure of Chinese social media is its extremely long (power-law like) tail. Figure 1
gives a sample of the sites and their logos in Chinese (in panel a) and a pie chart of the
number of posts that illustrate this long tail (in panel b). The largest sources of posts
include blog.sina (with 59% of posts), hi.baidu, voc, bbs.m4, and tianya, but the tail keeps
going.2
1See MacKinnon (2012) for additional information on the censorship process.
2See http://blog.sina.com.cn/, http://hi.baidu.com/, http://voc.com.cn/,
http://bbs.m4.cn/, and http://tianya.cn/.
8Social media posts cover such a huge range of topics that a random sampling strategy
attempting to cover everything is rarely informative about any individual topic of inter-
est. Thus, we begin with a stratiﬁed random sampling design, organized hierarchically.
We ﬁrst choose 85 separate topic areas within three categories of hypothesized political
sensitivity, ranging from “High” (such as Ai Weiwei) to “Medium” (such as the one child
policy) to “Low” (such as a popular online video game). We chose the speciﬁc topics
within these categories by reviewing prior literature, consulting with China specialists,
and studying current events. Appendix A gives a complete list. Then, within each topic
area, deﬁned by a set of keywords, we collected all social media posts over a six month pe-
riod. We examined the posts in each area, removed spam, and explored the content with
the tool for computer-assisted reading (Grimmer and King, 2011; Crosas et al., 2012).
With this procedure we collected 3,674,698 posts, with 127,283 randomly selected for
further analysis. (We repeated this procedure for other time periods, and in some cases in
more depth for some issue areas, and overall collected and analyzed 11,382,221 posts.)
All posts originated from sites in China, were written in Chinese, and excluded those from
Hong Kong and Taiwan. For each post, we examined its content, placed it on a timeline
according to topic area, and revisited the website from which it came repeatedly there-
after to determine whether it was censored. We supplemented this information with other
speciﬁc data collections as needed.
The censors are not shy, and so we found it straightforward to distinguish (intentional)
censorship from sporadic outages or transient time-out errors. The censored web sites in-
clude notes such as “Sorry, the host you were looking for does not exist, has been deleted,
or is being investigated” ( ) and
are sometimes even adorned with pictures of Jingjing and Chacha, Internet police cartoon
characters ( ).
Although our methods are faster than the Chinese censors, the censors nevertheless
appear highly expert at their task. We illustrate this with analyses of random samples
of posts surrounding the 9/27/2011 Shanghai Subway crash, and posts collected between
4/10/2012 and 4/12/2012 about Bo Xilai, a recently deposed member of the Chinese elite,
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Figure 2: The Speed of Censorship, Monitored in Real-Time
and a separate collection of posts about his wife, Gu Kailai, who was accused and con-
victed of murder. We monitored each of the posts in these three areas continuously in near
realtimefor9days. (Censorshipinotherareasfollowthesamebasicpattern.) Histograms
of the time until censorship appear in Figure 2. For all three, the vast majority of censor-
ship activity occurs within 24 hours of the original posting, although a few deletions occur
longer than ﬁve days later. This is a remarkable organizational accomplishment, requiring
large scale military-like precision: The many leaders at different levels of government
and at different internet content providers ﬁrst need to come to a decision (by agreement,
direct order, or compromise) about what to censor in each situation; they need to commu-
nicate it to tens or hundreds of thousands of individuals; and then they must all complete
execution of the plan within about 24 hours. As Edmond (2012) points out, the prolifera-
tion of information sources on social media makes information more difﬁcult to control;
however, the Chinese government has overcome these obstacles on a national scale. Given
the normal human difﬁculties of coming to agreement with many others, and the usual dif-
ﬁculty of achieving high levels of inter-coder reliability on interpreting text (e.g., Hopkins
and King, 2010, Appendix), the effort the government puts into its censorship program
is large, and highly professional. We have found some evidence of disagreements within
this large and multifarious bureaucracy, such as at different levels of government, but we
have not yet studied these differences in detail.
103.3 Limitations
As we show below, our methodology reveals a great deal about the goals of the Chinese
leadership, but it misses self-censorship and censorship that may occur before we are able
to obtain the post in the ﬁrst place; it also does not quantify the direct effects of The Great
Firewall, keyword blocking, or search ﬁltering in ﬁnding what others say. We have also
not studied the effect of physical violence, such as the arrest of bloggers, or threats of
the same. Although many ofﬁcials and levels of government have a hand in the decisions
about what and when to censor, our data only sometimes enable us to distinguish among
these sources.
We are of course unable to determine the consequences of these limitations, although
it is reasonable to expect that the most important of these are physical violence, threats
and the resulting self-censorship. Although the social media data we analyze include ex-
pressions by millions of Chinese and cover an extremely wide range of topics and speech
behavior, the presumably much smaller number of discussions we cannot observe are
likely to be those of the most (or most urgent) interest to the Chinese government.
Finally, in the past, studies of Internet behavior were judged based on how well their
measures approximated “real world” behavior; subsequently, online behavior has become
such a large and important part of human life that the expressions observed in social
media is now important in its own right, regardless of whether it is a good measure of
non-Internet freedoms and behaviors. But either way, we offer little evidence here of
connections between what we learn in social media and press freedom or other types of
human expression in China.
4 Analysis Strategy
Overall, an average of approximately 13% of all social media posts are censored. This
average level is quite stable over time when aggregating over all posts in all areas, but
masks enormous changes in volume of posts and censorship efforts. Our ﬁrst hint of
what might (not) be driving censorship rates is a surprisingly low correlation between our
ex ante measure of political sensitivity and censorship: Censorship behavior in the Low
11and Medium categories was essentially the same (16% and 17% respectively) and only
marginally lower than the High category (24%).3 Clearly something else is going on. To
convey what this is, we now discuss our coding rules, our central hypothesis, and the exact
operational procedures the Chinese government may use to censor.
4.1 Coding Rules
We discuss our coding rules in ﬁve steps. First, we begin with social media posts or-
ganized into the 85 topic areas deﬁned by keywords during from our stratiﬁed random
sampling plan. Although we have conducted extensive checks that these are accurate (by
reading large numbers and also via modern computer-assisted reading technology), our
topic areas will inevitably (with any machine or human classiﬁcation technology) include
some posts that do not belong. We take the conservative approach of ﬁrst drawing con-
clusions even when affected by this error. Afterward, we then do numerous checks (via
the same techniques) after the fact to ensure we are not missing anything important. We
report below the few patterns that could be construed as a systematic error; each one turns
out to strengthen our conclusions.
Second, conversation in social media within almost all topic areas (and countries) is
well known to be highly “bursty,” that is with periods of stability punctuated by occasional
sharp spikes in volume around speciﬁc subjects (Ratkiewicz et al., 2010). We also found
that with only two exceptions — pornography and criticisms of the censors, described
below — censorship effort is often especially intense within volume bursts. Thus, we
organize our data around these volume bursts. We think of each of the 85 topic areas as a
six month time series of daily volume and detect bursts using the weights calculated from
robust regression techniques to identify outlying observations from the rest of the time
series (Huber, 1964; Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987). In our data, this sophisticated burst
detection algorithm is almost identical to using time periods with volume more than three
standard deviations greater than the rest of the six month period. With this procedure, we
3That all three ﬁgures are higher than the average level of 13% reﬂects the fact that the topic areas we
picked ex ante had generated at least some public discussion and included posts about events with collective
action potential.
12detected 87 distinct volume bursts within 67 of the 85 topic areas.4
Third, we examined the posts in each volume burst and identiﬁed the real world event
associated with the online conversation. This was easy and the results unambiguous.
Fourth, we classiﬁed each event into one of ﬁve content areas: (1) collective action
potential, (2) criticism of the censors, (3) pornography, (4) government policies, and (5)
other news. As with topic areas, each of these categories may include posts that are
critical or not critical of the state, its leaders, and its policies. We deﬁne collective action
as the pursuit of goals by more than one person controlled or spurred by actors other
than government ofﬁcials or their agents. Our theoretical category of “collective action
potential” involves any event that has the potential to cause collective action, but to be
conservative, and to ensure clear and replicable coding rules, we limit this category to
events which (a) involve protest or organized crowd formation outside the Internet; (b)
related to individuals who have organized or incited collective action on the ground in
the past; or (c) relate to nationalism or nationalist sentiment that have incited protest or
collective action in the past. (Nationalism is treated separately because of its frequently
demonstrated high potential to generate collective action and also to constrain foreign
policy, an areas which has long been viewed as a special prerogative of the government;
Reilly 2012.)
Events are categorized as criticism of censors if they pertain to government or non-
governmententitieswithcontrolovercensorship, includingindividualsandﬁrms. Pornog-
raphy includes advertisements and news about movies, websites, and other media contain-
ing pornographic or explicitly sexual content. Policies refer to government statements or
reports of government activities pertaining to domestic or foreign policy. And “other
news” refers to reporting on events, other than those which fall into one of the other four
categories.
Finally, we conducted a study to verify the reliability of our event coding rules. To do
this, we gave our rules above to two people familiar with Chinese politics and asked them
to code each of the 87 events (each associated with a volume burst) into one of the ﬁve
4We attempted to identify duplicate posts, the Chinese equivalent of “retweets”, sblogs (spam blogs),
and the like. Excluding these posts had no noticeable effect on our results.
13categories. The coders worked independently and classiﬁed each of the events on their
own. Decisions by the two coders agreed in 98.9% (i.e., 86 of 87) of the events. The only
event with divergent codes was the pelting of Fang Binxing (the architect of China’s Great
Firewall) with shoes and eggs. This event included criticism of the censors and to some
extent collective action because several people were working together to throw things at
Fang. We broke the tie by counting this event as an example of criticism of the censors,
but however this event is coded does not affect our results since we predict both will be
censored.
4.2 Central Hypothesis
Our central hypothesis is that the government censors all posts in topic areas during vol-
ume bursts that discuss events with collective action potential. That is, the censors do not
judge whether individual posts have collective action potential, perhaps in part because
ratesofintercoderreliabilitywouldlikelybeverylow. Infact, Kuran(1989)andLohmann
(2002) show that it is information about a collective action event that propels collective
action and so distinguishing this from explicit calls for collective action would be difﬁ-
cult if not impossible. Instead, we hypothesize that they make the much easier judgment,
about whether the posts are on topics associated with events that have collective action
potential, and they do it regardless of whether they criticize the state or not.
The censors also attempt to censor all posts in the categories of pornography and
criticism of the censors, but not posts within event categories of government policies and
news.
4.3 The Government’s Operational Procedures
The exact operational procedures by which the Chinese government censors is of course
not observed. But based on conversations with individuals within and close to the Chinese
censorship apparatus, we believe our coding rules can be viewed as an approximation to
them. (In fact, after our paper was written and made public, we received communications
conﬁrming our story.) We deﬁne topic areas by hand, sort social media posts into topic
areas by keywords, and detect volume bursts automatically via statistical methods for time
14series data on post volume. (These steps might be combined by the government to detect
topics automatically based on spikes in posts with high similarity, but this would likely in-
volve considerable error given inadequacies in fully automated clustering technologies.)
In some cases, identifying the real world event might occur before the burst, such as if
the censors are secretly warned about an upcoming event (such as the imminent arrest of
a dissident) that could spark collective action. Identifying events from bursts that were
observed ﬁrst would need to be implemented at least mostly by hand, perhaps with some
help from algorithms that identify statistically improbable phrases. Finally, the actual de-
cisiontocensoranindividualpost—whichaccordingtoourhypothesisinvolveschecking
whether it is associated with a particular event — is almost surely accomplished largely
by hand, since no known statistical or machine learning technology can achieve a level of
accuracy anywhere near that which we observe in the Chinese censorship program. Here,
censors may begin with keyword searches on the event identiﬁed, but will need to man-
ually read through the resulting posts to censor those which are related to the triggering
event. For example, when censors identiﬁed protests in Zengcheng as precipitating online
discussion, they may have conducted a keyword search among posts for Zengcheng, but
they would have had to read through these posts by hand to separate posts about protests
from posts talking about Zengcheng in other context, say Zengcheng’s lychee harvest.
5 Results
We now offer three increasingly speciﬁc tests of our hypotheses. These tests are based
on (1) post volume, (2) the nature of the event generating each volume burst, and (3) the
speciﬁc content of the censored posts.
5.1 Post Volume
If the goal of censorship is to stop discussions with collective action potential, then we
would expect more censorship during volume bursts than at other times. We also expect
some bursts — those with collective action potential — to have much higher levels of
censorship.
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Figure 3: “Censorship Magnitude,” the percent of posts censored inside a volume burst
minus outside volume bursts.
To begin to study this pattern, we deﬁne censorship magnitude for a topic area as
the percent censored within a volume burst minus the percent censored outside all bursts.
(The base rates, which vary very little across issue areas and which we present in detail in
graphs below, do not impose empirically relevant ceiling or ﬂoor effects on this measure.)
This is a stringent measure of the interests of the Chinese government because censoring
during a volume burst is obviously more difﬁcult owing to there being more posts to
evaluate, less time to do it in, and little or no warning of when the event will take place.
Panel (a) in Figure 3 gives a histogram with results that appear to support our hypothe-
ses. The results show that the bulk of volume bursts have a censorship magnitude centered
around zero, but with an exceptionally long right tail (and no corresponding long left tail).
Clearly volume bursts are often associated with dramatically higher levels of censorship
even compared to the baseline during the rest of the six months for which we observe a
topic area.
5.2 The Nature of Events Generating Volume Bursts
We now show that volume bursts generated by events pertaining to collective action, criti-
cism of censors, and pornography are censored, albeit as we show in different ways, while
16post volume generated by discussion of government policy and other news are not. We
discuss the state critique hypothesis in the next subsection. Here, we offer three separate,
and increasingly detailed, views of our present results.
First, consider Panel (b) of Figure 3, which takes the same distribution of censorship
magnitude as in Panel (a) and displays it by event type. The result is dramatic: events
related to collective action, criticism of the censors, and pornography (in red, orange, and
yellow) fall largely to the right, indicating high levels of censorship magnitude, while
events related to policies and news fall to the left (in blue and purple). On average, cen-
sorship magnitude is 27% for collective action, but −1% and −4% for policy and news.5
Second, we list the speciﬁc events with the higest and lowest levels of censorship
magnitude. These appear, using the same color scheme, in Figure 4. The events with the
highest collective action potential include protests in Inner Mongolia and Zengcheng, the
arrest of artist-slash-political dissident Ai Weiwei, and the bombings over land claims in
Fuzhou. Notably, one of the highest “collective action potential” events was not political
at all: following the Japanese earthquake and subsequent meltdown of the nuclear plant
in Fukushima, a rumor spread through Zhejiang province that the iodine in salt would
protect people from radiation exposure, and a mad rush to buy salt ensued. The rumor
was biologically false, and had nothing to do with the state one way or the other, but it
washighlycensored; thereasonappearstobebecauseofthelocalizedcontrolofcollective
expression by actors other than the government. Indeed, we ﬁnd that salt rumors on local
websites are much more likely to be censored than salt rumors on national websites.6
Consistent with our theory of collective action potential, some of the most highly cen-
sored events are not criticisms or even discussions of national policies, but rather highly
localized collective expressions that represent or threaten group formation. One such ex-
ampleispostsonalocalWenzhouwebsiteexpressingsupportforChenFei, aenvironmen-
tal activist who supported an environmental lottery to help local environmental protection.
Even though Chen Fei is supported by the central government, all posts supporting him
5The baseline (the percent censorship outside of volume bursts) is typically very small, 3-5% and varies
relatively little across topic areas.
6As in the two relevant events in Figure 4, pornography often appears in social media in association with
the discussion of some other popular news or discussion, to attract viewers.
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Figure 4: Events with Highest and Lowest Censorship Magnitude
on the local website are censored, likely because of his record of organizing collective
action. In the mid-2000s, Chen founded an environmental NGO ( )
with more than 400 registered members who created China’s ﬁrst “no-plastic bag vil-
lage”, which eventually led to legislation on use of plastic bags. Another example is
a heavily censored group of posts expressing collective anger about lead poisoning in
Jiangsu Province’s Suyang County from battery factories. These posts talk about children
sickened by pollution from lead acid battery factories in Zhejiang province belonging to
the Tianneng Group ( ), and report that hospitals refused to release results of
lead tests to patients. In January 2011, villagers from Suyang gathered at the factory to
demand answers. Such collective organization is not tolerated by the censors, regardless
of whether it supports the government or criticizes it.
In all events categorized as having collective action potential, censorship within the
event is more frequent than censorship outside the event. In addition, these events are, on
average, considerably more censored than other types of events. These facts are consistent
18with our theory that the censors are intentionally searching for and taking down posts re-
lated to event with collective action potential. However, we add to these tests one based on
an examination of what might lead to different levels of censorship among events within
this category: Although we have developed a quantitative measure, some of the events in
this category clearly have more collective action potential than others. By studying the
speciﬁc events, it is easy to see that events with the lowest levels of censorship magni-
tude generally have less collective action potential than the very highly censored cases, as
consistent with our theory.
To see this, consider the few events classiﬁed as collective action potential with the
lowest levels of censorship magnitude. These include a volume burst associated with
protests about ethnic stereotypes in the animated children’s movie Kungfu Panda 2, which
was properly classiﬁed as a collective action event, but its potential for future protests is
obviously highly limited. Another example is Qian Yunhui, a village leader in Zhejiang,
who led villagers to petition local governments for compensation for land seized and was
then (supposedly accidentally) crushed to death by a truck. These two events involving
Qian had high collective action potential, but both were before our observation period. In
our period, there was an event that led to a volume burst around the much narrower and far
less incendiary issue of how much money his family was given as a reparation payment
for his death.
Finally, we give some more detailed information of a few examples of three types
of events, each based on a random sample of posts in one topic area. First, Figure 5
gives four time series plots that initially involve low levels of censorship, followed by
a volume spike during which we witness very high levels of censorship. Censorship in
these examples are high in terms of the absolute number of censored posts and the percent
of posts that are censored. The pattern in all four graphs (and others we do not show) is
evident: the Chinese authorities disproportionately focus considerable censorship efforts
during volume bursts.
We also went further and analyzed (by hand and via computer-assisted methods de-
scribed in Grimmer and King 2011) the smaller number of uncensored posts during vol-
190
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
C
o
u
n
t
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Count Published
Count Censored
Collective Support 
 for Evironmental Lottery 
 on Local Website
(a) Rush to buy salt after earthquake
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
C
o
u
n
t
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Count Published
Count Censored Riots in 
 Zengcheng
(b) Riots in Zengcheng
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
C
o
u
n
t
Jan Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Count Published
Count Censored
Ai Weiwei 
 arrested
(c) Dissident Ai Weiwei
0
5
1
0
1
5
C
o
u
n
t
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Count Published
Count Censored
Protests in 
 Inner Mongolia
(d) Inner Mongolia Protests
Figure 5: High Censorship During Collective Action Events (in 2011)
20ume bursts associated with events that have collection action potential, such as in Panel
(a) of Figure 5 where the red area does not entirely cover the gray during the volume
burst. In this event, and the vast majority of cases like this one, uncensored posts are not
about the event, but just happen to have the keywords we used to identify the topic area.
Again we ﬁnd that the censors are highly accurate and aimed at increasing censorship
magnitude. Automated methods of individual classiﬁcation are not capable of this high a
level of accuracy.
Second, we offer four time series plots of random samples of posts in Figure 6 which
illustrate topic areas with one or more volume bursts but without censorship. These cover
important, controversial, and potentially incendiary topics — including policies involv-
ing the one child policy, education policy, and corruption, as well as news about power
prices — but none of the volume bursts where associated with any localized collective
expression, and so censorship remains consistently low.
Finally, we found that 83 of 85 topic areas exhibit censorship patterns portrayed by
Figures 5 and 6. The two with divergent patterns can be seen in Figure 7. These topics
involve analyses of random samples of posts in the areas of pornography (panel a) and
criticism of the censors (panel b). What is distinctive about these topics compared to the
remaining 83 we studied is that censorship levels remain high consistently the entire six
month period and, consequently, do not increase further during volume bursts. Similar to
American politicians who talk about pornography as undercutting the “moral ﬁber” of the
country, Chinese leaders describe it as violating public morality and damaging the health
of young people, as well as promoting disorder and chaos; regardless, censorship in one
form or another is often the consequence.
More striking is an oddly “inappropriate” behavior of the censors: They offer freedom
to the Chinese people to criticize every political leader except for the themselves, every
policy except the one they implement, and every program except the one they run. Even
within the strained logic the Chinese state uses to justify censorship, Figure 7 (Panel b)
— which reveals consistently high levels of censored posts that involve criticisms of the
censors — is remarkable.
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Figure 6: Low Censorship on News and Policy Events (in 2011)
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Figure 7: Two Topics with Continuous High Censorship Levels (in 2011)
5.3 Content of Censored and Uncensored Posts
Our ﬁnal test involves comparing the content of censored and uncensored posts. State
critiquetheorypredictsthatpostscriticalofthestatearethosecensored, regardlessoftheir
collective action potential. In contrast, the theory of collective action potential predicts
that posts related to collective action events will be censored regardless of whether they
criticize or praise the state, with both critical and supportive posts uncensored when events
have no collective action potential.
To conduct this test in a very large number of posts, we need a method of automated
text analysis that can accurately estimate the percentage of posts in each category of any
given categorization scheme. We thus adapt to the Chinese language the methodology
introduced in the English language by Hopkins and King (2010). This method does not
require (inevitably error prone) machine translation, individual classiﬁcation algorithms,
or identiﬁcation of a list of keywords associated with each category; instead, it requires
a small number of posts read and categorized in the original Chinese. We conducted a
series of rigorous validation tests and obtain highly accurate results — as accurate as if it
were possible to read and code all the posts by hand, which of course is not feasible. We
23describe these methods, and give a sample of our validation tests, in Appendix B.
For our analyses, we use categories of posts that are (1) critical of the state, (2) sup-
portive of the state, or (3) irrelevant or factual reports about the events. However, we are
not interested in the percent of posts in each of these categories, which would be the usual
output of the Hopkins and King procedure. We are also not interested in the percent of
posts in each category among those posts which were censored and among those which
were not censored, which would result from running the Hopkins-King procedure once
on each set of data. Instead, we need to estimate and compare the percent of posts cen-
sored in each of the three categories. We thus develop a Bayesian procedure (described
in Appendix B) to extend the Hopkins-King methodology to estimate our quantities of
interest.
To ﬁx ideas, we ﬁrst analyze speciﬁc events and then turn to a broader analysis of a
random sample of posts from all of our events. For collective action events we choose
those which unambiguously ﬁt our deﬁnition — the arrest of the dissident Ai Weiwei,
protests in Inner Mongolia, and bombings in reaction to the state’s demolition of housing
in Fuzhou city. Panel (a) of Figure 8 reports the percent of posts that are censored for
each event, among those that criticize the state (in red) and those which support the state
(in green); vertical bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals. As is clear, regardless of whether
the posts support or criticize the state, they are all censored at a high level, about 80%
on average. Despite the conventional wisdom that the censorship program is designed to
prune the Internet of posts critical of the state, a hypothesis test indicates that the percent
censorship for posts that criticize the state is not larger than the percent censorship of
posts that support the state, for each event. This clearly shows support for the collective
action potential theory and against the state critique theory of censorship.
We also conduct a parallel analysis for three topics, taken from the analysis in Figure
6, that cover highly visible and apparently sensitive policies associated with events that
had no collective action potential — one child policy, corruption policy, and news of
increasing food prices. In this situation, we again get the empirical result that is consistent
with our theory, in both analyses: Categories critical and supportive of the state both fall
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Figure 9: Content of Censored Posts
at about the same, low level of censorship, about 10% on average.
To validate that these results hold across all events, we randomly sample draw posts
from all volume bursts with and without collective action potential. Figure 9 presents the
results in parallel to those in Figure 8. Here, we see that categories critical and supportive
of the state again fall at the same, high level of censorship for collective action potential
events, while categories critical and supportive of the state fall at the same, low level of
censorship for news and policy events. Again, there is no signiﬁcant difference between
the percent censored among those which criticize and support the state, but a large and
signiﬁcant difference between the percent censored among collective action potential and
non-collective action potential events.
The results are unambiguous: posts are censored if they are in a topic area with col-
lective action potential and not otherwise. Whether or not the posts are in favor of the
25government, its leaders, and its policies has no measurable effect on the probability of
censorship.
Finally, we conclude this section with some examples of posts to give some of the
ﬂavor of exactly what is going on in Chinese social media. First we offer two examples,
not associated with collective action potential events, of posts not censored even though
they are unambiguously against the state and its leaders. For example, consider this highly
personal attack, naming the relevant locality:
“This is a city government [Yulin City, Shaanxi]
that treats life with contempt, this is government
ofﬁcials run amuck, a city government without
justice, a city government that delights in that
which is vulgar, a place where ofﬁcials all have
mistresses, a city government that is shameless
with greed, a government that trades dignity for
power, a government without humanity, a gov-
ernment that has no limits on immorality, a gov-
ernmentthatgoesbackonitsword, agovernment
that treats kindness with ingratitude, a govern-
ment that cares nothing for posterity...”
Another blogger wrote scathing critique of China’s One Child Policy, also without being
censored:
“The [government] could promote voluntary
birth control, not coercive birth control that de-
prives people of descendants. People have al-
ready been made to suffer for 30 years. This
cannot become path dependent, prolonging an
ill-devised temporary, emergency measure....
Without any exaggeration, the one child policy
is the brutal policy that farmers hated the most.
This “necessary evil” is rare in human history,
attracting widespread condemnation around the
world. It is not something we should be proud
of.”
Finally in a blog castigating the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) for its broken promise
of democratic, constitutional government while, with reference to the Tiananmen square
incident, another wrote, the following state critique, again without being censored:
26“I have always thought China’s modern history
to be full of progress and revolution. At the end
of the Qing, advances were seen in all areas, but
after the Wuchang uprising, everything was lost.
The Chinese Communist Party made a promise
of democratic, constitutional government at the
beginning of the war of resistance against Japan.
But after 60 years that promise yet to be hon-
ored. China today lacks integrity, and account-
ability should be traced to Mao. In the 1980s,
Deng introduced structural political reforms, but
after Tiananmen, all plans were permanently put
on hold...intra- party democracy espoused today
is just an excuse to perpetuate one party rule”
These posts are neither exceptions nor unusual: We have thousands more. Negative
posts, including those about “sensitive” topics such as Tiananmen square or reform of
China’s one-party system, do not accidentally slip through a leaky or imperfect system.
The evidence indicates that the censors have no intention of stopping them. Instead, they
are focused on removing posts that have collective action potential, regardless of whether
or not they cast the Chinese leadership and their policies in a favorable light.
To emphasize this point, we now highlight the obverse condition by giving examples
of two posts related to events with collective action potential that support the state but
which nevertheless were quickly censored. During the bombings in Fuzhou, the govern-
ment censored this post, which unambiguously condemns the actions of Qian Mingqi, the
bomber, and explictly praises the government’s work on the issues of housing demolition,
which precipitated the bombings:
27“The bombing led not only to the tragedy of his
death but the death of many government workers.
Even if we can verify what Qian Mingqi said on
Weibo thatthe building demolitioncaused agreat
deal of personal damage, we should still con-
demn his extreme act of retribution...The gov-
ernment has continually put forth measures and
laws to protect the interests of citizens in building
demolition. And the media has called attention to
the plight of those experiencing housing demoli-
tion. The rate at which compensation for housing
demolition has increased exceeds inﬂation. In
many places, this compensation can change the
fate of an entire family. ”
Another example is the following censored post supporting the state. It accuses the lo-
cal leader Ran Jianxin, whose death in police custody triggered protests in Lichuan, of
corruption:
“According to news from the Badong county pro-
paganda department website, when Ran Jianxin
was party secretary in Lichuan, he exploited
his position for personal gain in land requisi-
tion, building demolition, capital construction
projects, etc. He accepted bribes, and is sus-
pected of other criminal acts.”
6 Concluding Remarks
The new data and methods we offer seem to reveal highly detailed information about
the interests of the Chinese people, the Chinese censorship program, and the Chinese
government over time and within different issue areas. These results also shed light on an
enormous secretive government program designed to suppress information, as well as on
the interests, intentions and goals of the Chinese leadership.
The evidence suggests that when the leadership allowed social media to ﬂourish in the
country, they also allowed the full range of expression of negative and positive comments
about the state, its policies, and its leaders. As a result, government policies sometimes
look as bad, and leaders can be as embarrassed, as is often the case with elected politicians
indemocraticcountries, but, astheyseemtorecognize, lookingbaddoesnotthreatentheir
28hold on power so long as they manage to eliminate discussions associated with events that
have collective action potential — where a locus of power and control, other than the
government, inﬂuences the behaviors of masses of Chinese people. With respect to this
type of speech, the Chinese people are individually free but collectively in chains.
Much research could be conducted on the implications of this governmental strategy;
as a spur to this research, we offer some initial speculations here. For one, so long as
collective action is prevented, social media can be an excellent way to obtain effective
measures of the views of the populace about speciﬁc public policies and experiences with
the many parts of Chinese government and the performance of public ofﬁcials. As such,
this “loosening” up on the constraints on public expression may, at the same time, be an
effective governmental tool in learning how to satisfy, and ultimately mollify, the masses.
From this perspective, the surprising empirical patterns we discover may well be a theo-
retically optimal strategy for a regime to use social media to maintain a hold on power.
For example, Dimitrov (2008) argues that regimes collapse when its people stop bringing
grievances to the state, since it is an indicator that the state is no longer regarded as legit-
imate. Similarly, Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2009) argues that dictators with low natural
resource endowments allow freer media in order to improve bureaucratic performance. By
extension, this suggests that allowing criticism, as we found the Chinese leadership does,
may legitimize the state and help the regime maintain power. Indeed, Lorentzen (2012)
develops a formal model in which an authoritarian regimes balance media openness with
regime censorship in order to minimize local corruption while maintaining regime stabil-
ity. Perhaps the formal theory community will ﬁnd ways of improving their theories after
conditioning on our empirical results.
More generally, beyond the ﬁndings of this paper, the data collected represents a new
way to study China and different dimensions of Chinese politics, as well as facets of com-
parative politics more broadly. For the study of China, our approach sheds light on au-
thoritarian resilience, center-local relations, sub-national politics, international relations,
and Chinese foreign policy. By examining what events are censored at the national level
versus a sub-national level, our approach indicates some areas where local governments
29can act autonomously. Additionally, by clearly revealing government intent, our approach
allows an examination of the differences between the priorities of various sub-national
units of government. Because we can analyze social media and censorship in the con-
tent of real-world events, this approach is able to reveal insights into China’s international
relations and foreign policy. For example, do displays of nationalism constrain the gov-
ernment’s foreign policy options and activities? Finally, China’s censorship apparatus can
be thought of as one of the input institutions Nathan (2003) identiﬁes as an important
source of authoritarian resilience, and the effectiveness and capabilities of the censorship
apparatus may shed light on the CCP’s regime institutionalization and longevity.
In the context of comparative politics, our work could directly reveal information
about state capacity as well as shed light on the durability of authoritarian regimes and
regime change. Recent work on the role of Internet and social media in the Arab spring
(Bellin, 2012; Ada et al., 2012) debate the exact role played by these technologies in
organizing collective action and motivating regional diffusion, but consistently highlight
the relevance of these technological innovations on the longevity of authoritarian regimes
worldwide. Edmond (2012) models how the increase in information sources (e.g., inter-
net, social media) impacts will be bad for a regime unless the regime has economies of
scale in controlling information sources. While internet and social media in general have
smaller economies of scale, because of how China devolves the bulk of censorship respon-
sibility to internet content providers, the regime maintains large economies of scale in the
face of new technologies. China, as a relatively rich and resilient authoritarian regime,
with a sophisticated and effective censorship apparatus, is probably being watched closely
by autocrats from around the world.
Beyond learning the broad aims of the Chinese censorship program, we seem to have
unearthed a valuable source of continuous time information on the interests of the Chinese
people and the intentions and goals of the Chinese government. Although we illustrated
this with time series in 85 different topic areas, the effort could be expanded to many other
areas chosen ex ante or even discovered as online communities form around new subjects
over time. Censorship behavior we observe may be predictive of future actions outside the
30Internet, is informative even when the traditional media is silent, and would likely serve a
variety of other scholarly and practical uses in government policy and business relations.
Along the way, we also developed methods of computer-assisted text analysis that we
demonstrate work well in the Chinese language and adapted it to this application. These
methods would seem to be of use far beyond our speciﬁc application. We also conjecture
that our data collection procedures, text analysis methods, engineering infrastructure, the-
ories, and overall analytic and empirical strategies might be applicable in other parts of
the world that suppress freedom of the press.
A Topic Areas
Our stratiﬁed sampling design includes the following 85 topic areas chosen from three
levels of hypothesized political sensitivity described in Section 3. Although we allow
overlap across topic areas, empirically we ﬁnd almost none.
High: Ai Weiwei, Chen Guangcheng, Fang Binxing, Google and China, Jon Hunstman,
Labor strike and Honda, Li Chengpeng, Lichuan protests over the death of Rao Jianxin,
Liu Xiaobo, Mass incidents, Mergen, Pornographic websites, Princelings faction, Qian
Mingqi, Qian Yunhui, Syria, Taiwan weapons, Unrest in Inner Mongolia, Uyghur protest,
Wu Bangguo, Zengcheng protests
Medium: AIDS, Angry Youth, Appreciation and devaluation of CNY against the dol-
lar, Bo Xilai, China’s environmental protection agency, Death penalty, Drought in central-
southernprovinces, Environmentandpollution, FiftyCentParty, Foodprices, Foodsafety,
Google and hacking, Henry Kissinger, HIV, Huang Yibo, Immigration policy, Inﬂation,
Japanese earthquake, Kim Jong Il, Kungfu Panda 2, Lawsuit against Baidu for copyright
infringement, Lead Acid Batteries and pollution, Libya, Micro-blogs, National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission, Nuclear Power and China, Nuclear weapons in Iran,
Ofﬁcial corruption, One child policy, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan Weapons, People’s Lib-
eration Army, Power prices, Property tax, Rare Earth metals, Second rich generation,
Solar power, State Internet Information Ofﬁce, Su Zizi, Three Gorges Dam, Tibet, U.S.
31policy of quantitiative easing, Vietnam and South China Sea, WeiJiabao and legal reform,
Xi Jinping, Yao Jiaxin
Low: Chinese investment in Africa, Chinese versions of Groupon, Da Ren Xiu on
Dragon TV (Chinese American Idol), DouPo CangQiong (serialized internet novel), Ed-
ucation reform, Health care reform, Indoor smoking ban, Let the Bullets Fly (movie), Li
Na (Chinese tennis star), MenRen XinJi (TV drama), New Disney theme park in Shang-
hai, Peking opera, Sai Er Hao (online game), Social security insurance, Space shuttle
Endeavor, Trafﬁc in Beijing, World Cup, Zimbabwe
B Automated Chinese Text Analysis
We begin with methods of automated text analysis developed in Hopkins and King (2010)
and now widely used in academia and private industry. This approach enables one to
deﬁne a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, to then code a small number
of example posts within each category (known as the labeled “training set”), and to infer
the proportion of posts within each category in a potentially much larger “test set” without
hand coding their category labels. The methodology is colloquially known as “ReadMe,”
which is the name of open source software program that implements it.
We adapt and extend this method for our purposes in four steps. First, we translate
different binary representations of Chinese text to the same unicode representation. Sec-
ond, we eliminate punctuation and drop characters that do not appear in fewer than 1% or
more than 99% of our posts. Since words in Chinese are composed of 1–5 characters, but
without any spacing or punctuation to demarcate them, we experimented with methods of
automatically “chunking” the characters into estimates of words; however, we found that
ReadMe was highly accurate without this complication.
And ﬁnally, whereas ReadMe returns the proportion of posts in each category, our
quantity of interest in Section 5.3 is the proportion of posts which are censored in each
category. We therefore run ReadMe twice, once for the set of censored posts (which we
denote C) and once for the set of uncensored posts (which we denote U). For any one
32of the mutually exclusive categories, which we denote A, we calculate the proportion
censored, P(C|A) via an application of Bayes theorem:
P(C|A) =
P(A|C)P(C)
P(A)
=
P(A|C)P(C)
P(A|C)P(C) + P(A|U)P(U)
Quantities P(A|C), P(A|U) are estimated by ReadMe whereas P(C) and P(U) are the
observed proportions of censored and uncensored posts in the data. Therefore, we can
back-outP(C|A). WeproduceconﬁdenceintervalsforP(C|A)bysimulation: wemerely
plug in simulations for each of the right side components from their respective posterior
distributions.
This procedure requires no translation, machine or otherwise. It does not require
methods of individual classiﬁcation, which are not sufﬁciently accurate for estimating
category proportions. The methodology is considered a “computer-assisted” approach
because it ampliﬁes the human intelligence used to create the training set rather than the
highly error-prone process of requiring humans to assist the computer in deciding which
words lead to which meaning.
Finally, we validate this procedure with many analyses like the following, each in a
different subset of our data. First, we train native Chinese speakers to code Chinese lan-
guage blog posts into a given set of categories. For this illustration, we use 1,000 posts
about the labor strikes in 2010, and set aside 100 as the training set. The remaining 900
constituted the test set. The categories were (a) facts supporting employers, (b) facts sup-
porting workers, (c) opinions supporting workers, and (d) opinions supporting employers
(or irrelevant). The true proportion of posts censored (given vertically) in each of four
categories (given horizontally) in the test set is indicated by four black dots in Figure 10.
Using the text and categories from the training set and only the text from the test set, we
estimate these proportions using our procedure above. The conﬁdence intervals, repre-
sented as simulations from the posterior distribution, are given in set of red dots for each
of the categories, in the same ﬁgure. Clearly the results are highly accurate, covering the
black dot in all four cases.
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37Supplementary Appendix: Prediction as Evidence of In-
tent
In this section, we offer a ﬁnal indication that rates and topics of censorship behavior
can serve as a measure of the intent of the Chinese leadership. The idea here is that if
censorship is a measure of intent to act, then it ought to have some useful predictive value.
However, predictingmostactionsoftheChineseleadershipisrelativelyeasybecausemost
of what they do (among that which we observe through the media) are merely responses to
exogenous events. The difﬁcult cases for prediction, and those of the most interest from
the point of view of understanding China for scholarly and practical policy purposes,
are those which are unprovoked, are in some sense voluntary actions that are otherwise
unpredictable, and, for our purposes, have collective action potential. We focus on these
hard cases here.
We did not design this study or our data collection for predictive purposes, but we
can still use it to test our hypothesis. We do this via case-control methodology (King
and Zeng, 2001). First, we take all real world events we identiﬁed as having collective
action potential and remove those easy to predict as a response to exogenous events. This
left two events, neither of which could have been predicted at the time they occurred on
the basis of information in the traditional news media: the April 3rd, 2011 arrest of Ai
Weiwei and the June 25th, 2011 peace agreement with Vietnam regarding disputes in the
South China Sea. We analyze these two cases here and show how we could have predicted
them from censorship rates. In addition, as we were ﬁnalizing this paper in early 2012,
the Bo Xilai incident shook China — an event widely viewed as “the biggest scandal to
rock China’s political class for decades” (Branigan, 2012) and one which “will continue
to haunt the next generation of Chinese leaders” (Economy, 2012) — and we happened
to still have our monitors running. This meant that we could use this third surprise event
as another test of our hypothesis.
Next, we must choose how long in advance censorship behavior could plausibly be
used to predict these (otherwise surprise) events. The time interval needs to be long
enough so that the censors can do their job, we can detect systematic changes in the
percent censored, and so the prediction will have value, but not so long as to make the
prediction impossible. We choose ﬁve days as ﬁtting these constraints, the exact value of
which is of course arbitrary but in our data relatively unimportant. Thus we hypothesize
that the Chinese leadership took an (otherwise unobserved) decision to act approximately
ﬁve days in advance and prepared for it by changing levels of censorship so that they
differed from what they would have been otherwise. (Although we do this analysis retro-
spectively, it was only possible to use as a test because we were checking for censorship
rates in real time; going back to check censorship at a later date could induce an artiﬁcial
relationship solely due to coding rules.)
In Panel (a) of Figure 11, we apply the procedure to the surprise arrest of Ai Weiwei.
The vertical axis in this time series plot is the percent of posts censored. The gray area
is our ﬁve day prediction interval between the unobserved hypothesized decision to arrest
Ai Weiwei and the actual arrest. Nothing in the news media we have been able to ﬁnd
suggested that an arrest was imminent. The blue line is actual censorship levels and the
red line is a simple linear prediction based only on data greater than ﬁve days earlier than
the arrest; extrapolating it linearly ﬁve days forward gives an estimate of what would have
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happened without this hypothesized decision. Then the vertical difference between the
red and blue lines on April 3rd is our causal estimate; in this case, the predicted level, if
no decision had been made, is at about baseline levels at approximately 10%; in contrast,
the actual levels of censorship is more than twice as high. To conﬁrm that this result
was not due to chance, we conducted a permutation test, using all other 5 day intervals
preceding the arrest as placebo tests, and found that the effect in the graph is larger than
all the placebo tests.
We then repeat the procedure for the South China Sea peace agreement in Panel (b) of
Figure 11. The discovery of oil in the South China Sea led to an ongoing conﬂict between
Beijing and Hanoi, during which rates of censorship soared. According to the media,
conﬂict continued right up until the surprise peace agreement was announced on June
25th. Nothing in the media before that date hinted at a resolution of the conﬂict. However,
rates of censorship unexpectedly plummeted well before that date, clearly presaging the
agreement. We also conducted a permutation test here and again found that the effect in
the graph is larger than all the placebo tests.
Finally, we turn to the Bo Xilai incident. Bo, the son one of the eight elders of the
CCP, was thought to be a front runner for promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee
in CPC 18th National Congress in Fall of 2012. However, his political rise met an abrupt
end following his top lieutenant, Wang Lijun, seeking asylum at the American consulate
in Chengdu on February 6, 2012, four days after Wang was demoted by Bo. After Wang
revealed Bo’s alleged involvement in homicide of a British national, Bo was removed as
Chongqing party chief and suspended from the Politburo. Because of the extraordinary
nature of this event in revealing the behaviors and disagreements among the CCP’s top
leadership, we conducted a special analysis of the otherwise unpredictable event that pre-
cipitated this scandal—the demotion of Wang Lijun by Bo Xilai on February 2, 2012. It is
thought that Bo demoted Wang when Wang confronted Bo with evidence of his involved
in the death of Neil Heywood.
We thus conduct the same analysis for the demotion of Wang Lijun in Panel (c) of
Figure 11, and again see a large difference in actual and predicted percent censorship
before Wang’s demotion. Prior to Wang’s dismissal, nothing in the media hinted at the
39demotion that would lead to the spectacular downfall of one of China’s rising leaders.
And for the third of three cases, a permutation test reveals that the effect in the 5 days
prior to Wang’s demotion is larger than all the placebo tests.
The results in all three cases are strongly conﬁrm our theory, but we conducted this
analysis retrospectively, and with only three events, and so further research to validate
the ability of censorship to predict events in real time prospectively would certainly be
valuable.
40